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I. Introduction 
The 1980s were less than favorable to the U.S. real estate industry. Vast amounts of overbuilding 
occurred in most areas and in most property types. Commercial vacancy rates increased dramati-
cally and rents fell both in nominal and real terms. Untoward events (tax laws changes, deregulation 
of financial institutions, and a real estate depression in many areas of the country) virtually halted 
speculative development and caused a freefall in real estate prices. Real estate credit markets were 
crippled by the decade-long crisis in the S&L industry and the federal government's handling of 
that crisis, while large pools of government-owned real estate sold at distressed prices. Employ-
ment decreases in the finance, insurance, and real estate industry, and corporate consolidations in 
the late 1980s reduced the number of jobs for the industries who would otherwise be tenanting 
empty office buildings. Finally, environmental issues significantly increased the uncertainties in 
real estate development and added to overall construction delays. Today, we begin the 1990s with 
an environment of soft real estate markets in most domestic locations, and among real estate 
developers the widespread belief is that this is not just another down cycle. 
Given this recent past history, it seems like the perfect time to ask the question, How quickly 
do commercial real estate markets respond to changes in excess demand or supply? Traditionally, 
this problem has been known as the "speed of adjustment" problem, and it has been typically dis-
cussed in terms of stock-adjustment models of inventory investment [1; 6; 21]. Adjustment speeds 
are important for understanding future effects of real estate price changes and for interpreting 
recent events. The higher the adjustment speed, the greater the fraction of long-run adjustment 
experienced so far, the smaller the adjustments still to be expected, and the lower the implied 
long-run demand elasticity. 
Adjustment speeds also have important implications for macroeconomic policy. There is 
reason to believe, for example, that the slow economic growth in the U. S. during the four years 
of the Bush administration was attributable, in large part, to the massive overbuilding that oc-
curred in commercial property markets during the 1980s and the relatively slow process by which 
unemployed resources have been absorbed into productive new endeavors [16]. 
In what follows, we propose and test a stock-adjustment model of real estate investment. The 
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model is tested with quarterly data on the stock of retail, office, and industrial real estate in the 
US. during the 1980:1-1990:11 period. Then, the results are compared and contrasted to adjust-
ment speeds prevailing in Canadian and UK. real estate markets during approximately the same 
time period. Canadian and UK. commercial property markets provide an interesting juxtaposition 
to US. commercial property markets given their strikingly different institutional relationships. 
Barkham and GeItner [2] note that, owing to greater homogeneity in England, u.K. commercial 
real estate markets are far more informationally efficient than in the US. Byrne and Goldberg 
[8] argue that differences between US. and UK. commercial real estate cycles may arise as a 
result of dissimilarities in market size. We attribute the greater stability in Canadian and UK. 
commercial property markets to a variety of factors. 
II. Market Adjustment Process for Commercial Real Estate 
There is a tendency to regard commercial real estate prices and rents as being relatively slow to 
adjust, and to assume that the quantity of space will adjust to equilibrate the market. Rosen and 
Smith [24], for example, have asserted that residential landlords react to fluctuations in demand 
primarily by building up or drawing down inventories of unlet space. Residential prices and rents 
are then affected but only after a lag. 
A similar price-adjustment process for commercial real estate has been suggested by Shilling, 
Sirmans, and Corgel [27], and Voith and Crone [29]. They find that price adjustments are the 
strongest when the gap between the normal, long-run vacancy rate is the largest, and weakest 
when vacancies exceed the normal rate. 
Wheaton [30], and Wheaton and Torto [32] have argued that commercial rents are deter-
mined by bargaining between landlords and tenants. Landlords set the minimum rent that they 
will accept based on an expected vacant time on the market. The expected vacant time decreases 
with the flow of prospective tenants and increases with the amount of competitive space available. 
Tenants set the maximum rent that they will pay based on the opportunities they have available 
to rent other space and on the competition they perceive from other prospective tenants. Actual 
rents are determined somewhere between the maximum that the tenant will pay and the minimum 
that the landlord will accept. Wheaton and Torto [32] further assume that, because landlords and 
tenants may be slow to perceive the flow of perspective tenants or the amount of competitive 
space on the market, the actual level of rents will adjust gradually to the desired rent level. 
There is room for argument whether quantity adjustments clear the commercial property 
markets. Studies by Barth et al. [3], and Kling and McCue [19] find that there is a considerable 
lag in the supply response of new US. office construction to changing demand conditions. There 
is also some evidence of a weighty lag in the supply response of both industrial and retail real 
estate to changes in demand [31; 20; 4]. 
This work, however, can be criticized for various reasons. Perhaps the most damning criticism 
has to do with the failure of these studies to correct for autocorrelation in estimating adjustment 
speeds. It has long been realized that slow adjustment speeds can result when stock-adjustment 
models are estimated without correcting for autocorrelation [31; 20; 4]. 
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III. A Stock-Adjustment Model of Commercial Real Estate 
To examine the speed of adjustment in commercial real estate markets, we adopt the following 
specification. We begin by writing the desired stock of retail, office, or industrial properties as 
or 
where 
Ki; = the desired stock of capital, 
Ei = employment in industry i, 
cP = average square feet per employee, and 
Cit = random error term. 
The subscript i in this case refers to the retail, office, or industrial sector.! 
Next, we write a stock-adjustment model for retail, office, and industrial properties as 
where 
Kit = actual stock of capital, and 
8i = the speed of adjustment parameter. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
Equation (3) specifies that the change in Kit will respond only partially to the difference between 
the desired level of K i; and the past value of Kit-I. The rate at which the market responds is 
the adjustment coefficient 8i . If 8i equals one, then Ki; equals Kit in each period and markets 
fully adjust each period (which would be indicative of a build-to-suit real estate market with no 
speculative construction). As 8i becomes closer to zero, however, the longer it takes for real estate 
markets to equilibrate. This framework is developed in Blinder [6], and Maccini and Rossana [21], 
and many other papers. 
Substituting equation (2) for Ki; in (3) yields 
(4) 
or 
(5) 
where (3ji = 8i(3jiU = 0, 1), (32i = (1 - 8i), and eit = 8iCit. 
Finally, and most important, it might be thought that the error term Cit follows an AR(I) pro-
cess. Hence, to estimate (5) we use the following two-step procedure. First, we estimate 
1. The model in (1) is similar to the approach used by Birch [5] and others to forecast the demand for commercial 
real estate. 
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or 
Kit = oi(1 - Pi)f30i + 8;f3liEit - PiOil3liEit-1 + (Pi - Oi + I)Kit- 1 
- Pi(1 - oi)Kit- 1 + eit (6) 
(7) 
From the coefficients of Eit and Eit-I, we get an estimate of Pi, where Pi = -f-Li2/f-Lil. We use 
this estimate of Pi to construct Kit = Kit - PiKit-1 and Eit = Eit - PiEit-J. and then estimate 
(8) 
to get unique estimates of Oi, 13iO, and 13il' 
Note that in the likely event that the error terms ~it in (5) are correlated across the different 
real estate markets (Le., adjustments made in one market, while moving it towards equilibrium, 
move the other markets away from equilibrium), we estimate (7) and (8) using Zellner's Seem-
ingly Unrelated Regression technique. And where the error terms ~it in (5) are uncorrelated, then 
we obtain efficient estimates of Oi, 13iO, and 13i1 by performing ordinary least-squares estimation 
on each separate equation. 
To account for the adjustment lags between Ki; and Eit , we adopted a sequential search pro-
cess? This search process entailed estimating various versions of (5) with lagged values of Eit 
and choosing that lag structure for which the residual sum of squares was minimum. The reader 
is spared the laborious details of the many regressions that were run. 
To control for the effect of climatic and institutional events that repeat more or less regularly 
each year, three seasonal 0-1 variables are added to (5): S2 which takes on the value of 1 for the 
summer quarter and zero otherwise, S3 which takes on the value of 1 for the fall quarter and zero 
otherwise, and S4 which takes on the value of 1 for the winter quarter and zero otherwise. 
IV. The Data 
Our measures of Kit and Eit are in dollar values, as opposed to physical units, and generally cover 
the period 1980:1-1990:2. Values of Kit are computed from the flow of funds accounts for the 
US., Canada, and the UK. (see appendix for a more complete discussion). The data we analyze 
for Eit are from the National Income and Product Accounts (or National Income and Expenditure 
data) for the US., Canada, and the UK. All flows are measured at quarterly rates. 
Table I summarizes the value of new construction put in place and the excess returns on 
commercial real estate investments in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom during 
the 1980:1-1990:2 period. Two major conclusions are suggested by the table. First, the 1980s 
were a period of rapid growth for real estate in the US. and Canada. Total construction put in 
place in the US. increased in real terms from $55,345 million in 1980 to $78,229 million in 1990 
2. One can think of the lag between Ki; and Eit as arising from the fact that most real estate developers are reluctant 
to cancel a project once it is started, even in the face of poor economic news. This reluctancy generally reflects the high 
transaction costs associated with real estate development. There is also an inherent built-in time delay between when 
the decision to go ahead with a project is made and the project's eventual completion date, which is likely to vary from 
region to region, or country to country depending on the complexity of the project and the time necessary to obtain 
government approvals. 
Table I. Value of New Construction Put in Place and Excess Quarterly Rates of Return on Real Estate by Property Type: 
United States, Canada, and United Kingdom, 1980-1990 
Value of New Construction Put in Place Excess Quarterly Rates of Return, % 
Canadab 
United States a (millions of United Kingdom c 
(in $ millions) Canadian $) (in £ millions) United States d Canadae United Kingdomf 
Period Retail Office Industrial Retail Office Commercial Industrial Retail Office Industrial Retail Office Commercial Industrial 
80:1-83:4 4624 5446 4492 330 684 616 522 -0.34 0.96 -0.44 
84:1-87:4 7019 7382 3737 409 848 754 499* 0.59 -0.90 0.22 3.03** 0.52** 
88:1-90:2 7211 6627 4186 671 1191 1401 579 0.58 -1.48 0.10 2.89 0.82 
Mean 6153 6464 4131 417 844 832 516 0.29 -0.27 0.15 2.97 0.66 
% Change 56% 22% -7% 103% 74% 127% 11% 
Std. Dev. 1429 1166 678 185 273 354 154 1.02 2.18 0.84 1.08 2.13 
a. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Value of New Construction Put in Place (expressed in 1987 dollars). 
b. Statistics Canada, Building Permits, Monthly Survey (expressed in 1980 Canadian $). 
c. Department of the Environment, Great Britain, Housing and Construction Statistics (expressed in 1980 pounds). 
d. FRC/NCREIF returns series. 
e. Russell-Canadian returns series. 
f. Weatherall, Green & Smith returns series. 
*includes channel tunnel construction put in place. 
**for the period 85:1-87:4. 
-0.57 0.35 
-0.24 -0.48 
4.68 3.01 
0.73 0.47 
2.99 3.36 
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Figure IA. U.S. Retail Construction and Excess Rates of Return, 1980-1990 
(or a 41 percent increase). For Canada, total construction put in place increased in real terms 
from $6,981 million (Canadian dollars) in 1980 to $10,978 million (Canadian dollars) in 1990 
(or a 57 percent increase). In comparison, total construction put in place in the u.K. increased 
in real terms from £5,318 million in 1980 to £6,220 million in 1990 (or a 17 percent increase). 
Second, the rapid growth in office construction in the U.S. took place despite the fact that, 
as best as we can tell, investors were earning, on average, negative "excess returns" on office 
buildings. These quarterly returns are based on Frank Russell Company /National Council of Real 
Estate Investment Fiduciaries (FRC/NCREIF) less the risk-free rate and represent the perfor-
mance of real estate investments made by large institutional investors? In contrast, excess rates 
of return in the u.K. averaged 0.73 percent per quarter for commercial properties and 0.47 per-
cent per quarter for industrial properties during the period 1980:1-1990:2. Even more striking, 
excess rates of return in Canada averaged 2.97 percent per quarter for retail properties and 0.66 
percent per quarter for office buildings during the period 1985:1-1990:2. Here the u.K. excess 
return series is taken from Weatherall, Green and Smith (WGS) less the risk-free rate and is 
constructed similar to the FRC/NCREIF returns index. The Canadian excess return series is the 
Russell-Canadian index less the risk-free rate. 
Retail construction put in place in the U.S. increased significantly between the 1980:1-1983:4 
and 1988:1-1990:2 periods (see Figure lA). In the former period, the value of retail construction 
put in place in the U.S. averaged $4,624 million per quarter; in the latter period the value of 
retail construction put in place in the U.S. averaged $7,211 million per quarter (in constant 1987 
3. Measurement errors are likely to occur in the PRC /NCREIP series since the returns are based on appraised 
values, not on market prices. See Giliberto [14] imd GeItner [13] for a discussion of appraisal-based smoothing problems 
in the FRC/NCREIP returns series. 
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Figure lB. U.S. Office Construction and Excess Rates of Return, 1980-1990 
dollars) - an increase of 56 percent. The upward drift in the value of retail construction put in 
place in the US. begins around 1984:1-1984:2. The FRC/NCREIF retail excess rate of return 
series fluctuates considerably around 0.29 percent during the 1980:1-1990:2 period. 
For the US., the relationship between office construction put in place and excess rates of 
return on office buildings is a far cry from that envisaged by Kling and McCue [19].4 Office con-
struction put in place in the US. increased from $5,446 million per quarter in 1980:1-1983:4 
to $6,627 million per quarter in 1988:1-1990:2 (see Figure lB). During the same time period, 
quarterly excess rates of return on office buildings in the US. fell from a high of 0.96 percent 
in 1980:1-1983:4 to a negative 1.48 percent in 1988:1-1990:2. 
Industrial construction put in place in the US. declined from $4,492 million in 1980:1-
1983:4 to $3,737 in 1984:1-1987:4 (see Figure 1C). Thereafter it increased sharply, even though 
the FRC/NCREIF industrial excess rate of return index decreased in 1988:1-1990:2. 
Excess returns on Canadian real estate properties are only available over the 1985:1-1990:2 
period. The Russell-Canadian excess returns for retail properties averaged 3.03 percent per quarter 
in the 1985:1-1987:4 period and 2.89 percent per quarter in 1988:1-1990:2 (see Figure 2A). For 
office properties in Canada, the average excess returns were 0.52 percent per quarter in 1985:1-
1987:4 and 0.82 percent per quarter in 1988:1-1990:2 (see Figure 2B). Also notice that for Canada 
we restrict our attention to retail and office bUildings. 
Note that for the United Kingdom we have had to modify our definitions of non-residential 
real estate somewhat. The UK. classifies non-residential real estate into two categories: com-
mercial or industrial. Commercial real estate in this case includes income-producing property 
4. Others have noted that modeling office investment is difficult because office construction put in place is so variable 
[23; 31]. 
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Figure IC. U.S. Industrial Construction and Excess Rates of Return, 1980-1990 
such as office buildings, restaurants, shopping centers, hotels and motels, and stores. Here again, 
industrial real estate includes buildings and structures at manufacturing sites. 
For commercial properties in the u.K., the was excess returns index averaged a negative 0.57 
percent per quarter in the 1980:1-1983:4 period (see Figure 3A). During the 1984:1-1987:4 period, 
the commercial excess returns series averaged -0.24 percent per quarter. In 1988:1-1990:2, the 
commercial excess returns series averaged 4.68 percent per quarter. 
Interesting enough, performance of industrial real estate in the United Kingdom during the 
1980s stands in marked contrast to that of industrial real estate in the United States. Excess re-
turns on industrial properties were 0.35 percent per quarter in 1980:1-1983:4; decreased to a 
negative 0.48 percent per quarter in 1984:1-1987:4 and then increased markedly to 3.01 percent 
per quarter in 1988:1-1990:2 (see Figure 3B). 
V. Estimation Results 
Results of estimating (5) for U.S. retail, office, and industrial markets are provided in Table II, 
with standard errors shown in parentheses. Column (1) is estimated using ordinary least squares. 
Columns (2) and (3) are estimated using our two-step estimation procedure to correct for serial 
correlation. 
A few brief comments about Table II seem in order. First, the coefficient of E t - x , where x 
refers to a x-period lag, suggests that it takes between eight and twelve quarters for U.S. retail, 
office, and industrial markets to detect a change in the desired Kit and then to alter the actual Kit. 
This adjustment lag suggests that construction activity in the U.S. is relatively slow to react to 
economic shocks. 
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Figure 2A. Canadian Retail Construction and Excess Rates of Return, 1980-1990 
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Figure 2B. Canadian Office Construction and Excess Rates of Return, 1980-1990 
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Figure 3A. U.K. Commercial Construction and Excess Rates of Return, 1980-1990 
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Table II. Detenninants of Speed of Adjustment in U.S. Real Estate Markets 
(figures in parentheses are standard errors) 
Property Type 
Ordinary-Least Squares Estimates 
Retail Office a 
Variable x = 12 x=8 
f30 -2584 5372 
(3095) (4639) 
Et- x .0324 .0426 
(.01) (0.01) 
K t - 1 .9608 .7306 
(0.02) (0.04) 
S2 -1718 -1776 
(1132) (1086) 
S3 -1255 -742 
(1160) (1107) 
S4 -1996 -2050 
(1160) (1105) 
Summary Statistics: 
8 .0392 .2694 
p .1970 
R2 0.9967 .9961 
Root MSE 2652 2468 
h-value 0.41 
N 42 41 
a. Adjusted for serial correlation (see text). 
Industrial a 
x = 12 
-12620 
(7291) 
.0386 
(0.01) 
.4504 
(0.03) 
-1847 
(1250) 
-885 
(1267) 
-2475 
(1267) 
.5496 
.5548 
.9261 
2825 
41 
Second, the estimated short-run income elasticities for U.S. retail, office, and industrial prop-
erties are 0.07, 0.08, and 0.10, respectively. And the estimated long-run income elasticities are 
1.68, 0.31, and 0.19, respectively. These elasticities are measured in the usual way.5 
Third, as might be expected, the estimated speeds of adjustment are much slower for U.S. 
retail properties than for U.S. office and industrial buildings. This contention arises because most 
retail properties possess spatial monopolies to some degree either in fact or in the mind of the 
consumer. And so retail properties, in general, tend to be much more insulated from increased 
competition than office and industries properties. Adjustment speeds for U.S. retail, office, and 
industrial properties also depend on the rate of economic growth within each sector. Faster eco-
nomic growth generally implies a more rapid adjustment whenever new capital stock is more 
efficient than old. 
Our estimate of the speed of adjustment of Kit to K i; for U.S. retail properties is 0.0392 (that 
is, 3.92 percent per quarter). In contrast, the 8i point estimate for the U.S. office market is 26.94 
percent per quarter (see column (2)). And for U.S. industrial properties, the 8i point estimate 
5. We calculate the short-run and long-run elasticities as 
where a bar indicates the mean value. 
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Table IlL Determinants of Speed of Adjustment in Canadian Real Estate Markets 
(figures in parentheses are standard errors) 
Property Type 
SUR Estimates Adjusted for Serial Correlation 
Retail Office 
Variable (x = 4) (x = 4) 
i30 3735 2167 
(1023) (1799) 
Et- x 0.1l48 .1l85 
(0.02) (0.03) 
K t - 1 .1966 .3170 
(0.02) (0.02) 
S2 139 211 
(73) (Ill) 
S3 129 308 
(75) (1l4) 
S4 116 277 
(75) (1l4) 
Summary Statistics: 
8 .8034 .6830 
p .7059 .6409 
R2 
.9448 .9786 
Root MSE 175 265 
h-value 
N 45 45 
is 54.96 percent per quarter (see column (3)); more than fourteen times that of the speed of 
adjustment for US. retail properties.6 
Our results for Canadian real estate markets are shown in Table III. Both equations in Table III 
are based on Zellner's Seemingly Unrelated Regression technique adjusted for serial correlation. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Overall, the findings suggest that Canadian real estate 
markets adjust much quicker to shocks in Ki; than US. real estate markets. 
The estimates of f371 in Table III imply a long-run income elasticity of Kit with respect to 
income of 0.12 for Canadian retail properties and 0.09 for Canadian office buildings. Thus, in a 
given year a 10 percent decline in income translates into a 1.2 percent decrease in Kit for Cana-
dian retail properties and a 0.9 percent decrease in Kit for Canadian office buildings, both after 
a relatively short adjustment lag. The short-run income elasticities for Canadian retail and office 
buildings are 0.09 and 0.06, respectively. 
Regression results for UK. real estate markets are shown in Table IV. Note that the parameter 
estimates are based on Zellner's Seemingly Unrelated Regression technique unadjusted for serial 
correlation. Again, standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
The estimated speed of adjustment is 3.93 percent per quarter for UK. commercial proper-
6. To test Brueckner and Pereira's [7) hypothesis that wealth losses exacerbate the impact on Kit - Kit - lo we also 
included the variable /1pKit- 1 in (5), where Pit is the market valuation of real estate (taken from the FRC/NCREIF real 
estate index). Generally, the variable /1pKit- 1 had no statistical effect on Kit. Similar results (not reported here) were 
found for Canadian and U.K. real estate markets. 
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Table IV. Determinants of Speed of Adjustment in u.K. Real Estate Markets 
(figures in parentheses are standard errors) 
Property Type 
SUR Estimates Unadjusted for Serial Correlation 
Commercial Industrial 
Variable (x = 8) (x = 8) 
(30 9977 5839 
(20829) (11535) 
Et- x .0196 .0094 
(0.05) (0.03) 
K t - 1 .9607 .9599 
(0.06) (0.6) 
S2 1104 692 
(22332) (12427) 
S3 -941 -411 
(21865) (12168) 
S4 -30062 -16674 
(21891) (12184) 
Summary Statistics: 
8 .0393 .0401 
p 
R2 
.8256 .8292 
Root MSE 52370 29142 
h-value .30 .32 
N 46 46 
ties and 4.01 percent for UK. industrial properties. The estimated short-run income elasticities 
for UK. commercial and industrial properties are 0.01 and 0.008, respectively. And the estimated 
long-run income elasticities are 0.24 and 0.20, respectively. The estimate of (3it also suggests that 
it takes, on average, eight quarters for UK. commercial and industrial markets to detect a change 
in the desired Kit and then to alter the actual Kit. 
In general, the points to note about these results are (1) most commercial property mar-
kets suffer from a relatively long adjustment lag, and (2) contrary to the more recent theory on 
price-adjustment and market dynamics, quantity adjustments in commercial real estate markets 
are fairly sluggish. 
VI. Simulated Real Estate Cycles 
We now wish to illustrate the implications of the models estimated in section V. To do so, we 
simulate the impact of a 10 percent reduction in income on Kit under the following assumptions. 
First, we assume that once Kit adjusts to the new Ki; it will stay there indefinitely, under the 
assumption of constant demand and supply. We also assume that oscillations about the equilibrium 
value of Kit occur as the lagged-supply response works through the models. The cycle attenuates 
given sufficient time and, as eventual equilibrium is reached, the cycle ceases to exist. 
Figure 4 presents the results of our simulations for U.S. real estate markets. The percent de-
viations from the steady-state Kit that are shown in Figure 4 depend significantly on the estimated 
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Figure 4. Overbuilding Caused by a 10% Reduction in Y: U.S. Real Estate 
income elasticities and the observed adjustment speeds. Relatively slow adjustment speeds, for 
example, will tend to cause moderately flat real estate cycles. Relatively fast adjustment speeds, 
on the other hand, will tend to cause rather abrupt cycles and large social costs. 
For the US. office market, our simulations suggest that, after the adjustment lag, it takes 
about two years for the adjustment of the actual stock to be 90 percent complete. The corre· 
sponding adjustment period for the US. industrial real estate market is less than one year. For 
retail properties, the adjustment period is in excess of ten years.7 
An interesting contrast to these adjustment speeds is provided by Muth [22]. Muth finds 
that the adjustment period in the US. housing market is roughly six years. Rydell [25], on the 
other hand, finds that there is a 90 percent adjustment in the stock of housing within three years. 
Rydell also finds that the extent of the adjustment period depends upon the vacancy rates in the 
markets. At higher vacancy rates, the short·run effect of price is smaller and the long·run effect 
on quantity of housing services consumed is much higher. 
Along these same lines, anecdotal evidence suggests that the adjustment speed for US. office 
buildings increased from six years of extra supply in 1988 to twelve years in 1991 [26]. Adjust-
ment speeds for US. industrial and retail properties are much harder to document. Kling and 
McCue [20], using a vector autoregression model, document that macroeconomic variables affect 
industrial construction with a lag and that this lag is generally shorter than those reported for 
office properties. 
7. Note that these findings have nothing to say about the variation in the speed of adjustment among U. S. retail, 
office, and industrial real estate markets. To do so, it would be desirable to estimate equation (5) with data from the 
particular local real estate market to obtain the speed of adjustment for that market. 
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For Canadian real estate markets, our simulations suggest that the real estate cycles are much 
less sensational than US. real estate cycles - meaning the percent deviations from steady-state 
are much lower (see Figure 5). Also of central interest is the fact that approximately 90 percent 
of the excess supply in both Canadian retail and office markets is worked off in less than one year. 
We further notice that UK. real estate cycles are, by far, the most sedate (see Figure 6). The 
percent deviations from steady-state for UK. commercial or industrial real estate never exceed 
1/2 of one percent. Our simulations also suggest that with UK. investors seeking to add about 
one-sixth of the difference between desired and actual stock during a year, for the adjustment of 
the actual stock of UK. commercial and industrial real estate to be 90 percent complete, roughly 
fourteen years are required. 
VII. Explanations for the Abrupt Real Estate Cycles in the U.S. during the 1980s 
The most likely explanation of the abrupt real estate cycles in the US. during the 1980s is that they 
were caused by a variety of factors. Hendershott and Kane [16] argue that the decade-long crisis 
in the S&L industry and US. federal government's handling of that crisis created a lending frenzy 
in the US. during the 1980s, and that this lending frenzy led to vast amounts of overbuilding in 
US. real estate markets as many developers lost sight of demand and supply factors. 
A second seemingly possible explanation for the abrupt real estate cycles in the US. during 
the 1980s is Keynes's [18] bounded rationality argument. For a recent discussion of this literature 
applied to real estate, see De Bondt [12]. 
A third explanation of the abrupt real estate cycles in the US. during the 1980s asserts that 
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pro-development attitudes like those in many metropolitan areas in the US. tend to encourage 
overbuilding, whereas controlled growth environments like those in Canada and the UK. tend 
to foster a positive investment climate in the long-run. 
As another possibility, US. real estate markets during the 1980s may have responded ratio-
nally to large negative demand shocks. Cauley [10] notes that, after a negative demand shock-
like a change in tax laws as a restructuring and downsizing of the consumer, office, and defense 
sectors of the economy, all of which occurred in the US. during the 1980s - investors will typi-
cally wait until the price uncertainty is resolved to transact. This decline in asset liquidity, if 
substantial enough, can easily account for an abrupt real estate cycle. 
Many of the international differences in real estate cycles may also arise as a result of dis-
similarities in market size. For a more complete discussion of the relationship between real estate 
cycles and market size, see Bryne and Goldberg [8]. 
VIII. Events Since 1990 
Events since 1990 suggest that there have been marked changes in Canadian and UK. commercial 
real estate markets. Canadian commercial real estate markets, for example, appear at the moment 
to be vastly overbuilt. Greater metropolitan Toronto's year-end 1992 vacancy rate of 18.2 percent 
represents a high watermark in the market's vacancy problem. Montreal's overall office vacancy 
rate increased from 12.8 percent in 1990 to 17.9 percent in 1992. Ottawa's 1992 office vacancy rate 
is 12.1 percent, while office vacancies in Calgary, Edmonton, and Vancouver are currently in the 
13 to 20 percent range. 
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UK. commercial real estate markets also appear at the moment to be vastly overbuilt. Office 
vacancy rates in London's City and West End, for example, now exceed 15 percent. As a con-
sequence of the excess supply and slow absorption of commercial space, property values have 
fallen and building yields (rents divided by capital values) have increased significantly. Currently, 
building yields are over 9 percent - a historical high. These events predict a marked reduction 
in adjustment speeds for Canadian and UK. real estate markets. 
In the US., it is really much too early to tell whether or not returns from commercial real 
estate investments have bottomed out. During the past few years, new construction in the US. 
has slowed dramatically as lenders, wary of the excesses of the 1980s, have been very reluctant 
to finance real estate developments.8 There are also signs that real estate markets have matured 
from one where developers-investors typically built for their own portfolios into one where insti-
tutional investors -like in the UK. - are the driving force behind the merchant builder. Still, 
vacancy rates for office space hover in the 15-20 percent range, with some cities above 25 percent. 
Demand in the retail, office, and industrial areas remains weak in most markets and real returns 
on commercial real estate are at all-time lows. 
IX. Concluding Comments 
In the literature, it is frequently asserted that commercial real estate prices and rents move slug-
gishly toward equilibrium, leaving the quantity of space to act as a market clearer. Our results 
cast some serious doubts on this proposition. First, we find that quantity adjustments in US. 
commercial property markets respond with a relatively long lag before changes in the desired 
new capital stock are taken into account. We also find that, once the desired new capital stock 
is phased-in, the adjustment period is far from instantaneous. For US. office and industrial real 
estate markets, for example, the adjustment period ranges from one to two years. For US. retail 
property markets, the adjustment period is significantly longer. It should also be emphasized that, 
taken together, these results suggest that commercial property markets in the US. are susceptible 
to pronounced boom-and-bust cycles. 
Somewhat faster adjustment speeds with relatively shorter adjustment lags are found for 
Canadian commercial property markets. In UK. real estate markets, we find noticeably slower 
adjustment speeds. Most conspicuous in both Canadian and UK. commercial property markets 
is the responsiveness of commercial real estate to changes in income. Rather than observing 
periods of substantial overbuilding followed by periods of little, or no, growth, we find much 
greater stability in both Canadian and UK. commercial property markets (at least through the 
end of 1990). 
Appendix. Variables and Data Sources 
The following variables appear in the text. 
United States: 
Kit = outstanding stock of commercial real estate (in $ millions), constructed using a perpetual inven-
8. The passage of the Financial Institutions Regulatory Reform and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989 and com-
parable tightening of capital requirements on commercial banks has also played a major role in the continued decline of 
commercial construction put in place during the last few years. 
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tory technique with a constant economic depreciation rate fitted for data from the Commerce 
Department, Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth in the United States, 1925-1985. 
Eit = employment in industry i (in $ millions), from National1ncome and Product Accounts. 
Canada: 
Kit = outstanding stock of commercial real estate (in millions of Canadian $), constructed using a 
perpetual inventory technique with a constant economic depreciation rate fitted for data from 
Statistics Canada, Fixed Capital Flows and Stocks, 1987. 
Eit = employment in industry i, index numbers at constant factor costs, from Statistics Canada. 
United Kingdom: 
Kit = outstanding stock of commercial real estate (in £ millions), constructed using a perpetual in-
ventory technique with a constant economic depreciation rate fitted for data obtained from the 
National Accounts Statistics: Main Aggregates and Detailed Tables, 1988. 
Eit = employment in industry i (in £ millions), from National1ncome and Expenditure data. 
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